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The purpose of the paper is to provide a review of the economic literature on
poverty measurement, following the most important research contributions on this
subject described in Atkinson (1998) and Sen (1997).
Traditionally, the economic literature on the measurement of poverty has been
concerned with two questions: the identi￿cation of the poor and the aggregation
of the information on income and other relevant variables in measures of poverty to
be used for comparisons of poverty over time or across di⁄erent populations. The
problem of identi￿cation is usually de￿ned along several dimensions, that include
the choice of the variable measuring economic welfare and the speci￿cation of the
conditions that qualify individuals as poor in a given population. The problem
of aggregation is the problem of choice of the poverty index function and of the
de￿nition of the conditions that allow to make consistent ordinal comparisons of
poverty across di⁄erent populations. The paper is concerned in particular with
the problem of aggregation.
The research in this ￿eld, has been initially concerned with the study of the prop-
erties of the poverty index function. More recently, Atkinson (1987) and Foster
and Shorrocks (1988b, 1988c) have extended this type of analysis to the de￿nition
of the conditions that allow for consistent ordinal comparisons of poverty across
income distributions and have introduced the notion of poverty ordering. The
paper reviews the theory therefore considering ￿rst the problem of the de￿nition
of the properties of the poverty index function and then describing how these
properties can be used to de￿ne poverty orderings that allow to make consistent
ordinal poverty comparisons across di⁄erent populations. The analysis is based on
the application to the analysis of poverty, of the results that are used in the the-
ory of economic inequality to study the relation between the income distribution,
aggregate measures of economic inequality and economic welfare.
The theory is then applied to the study of recent developments in the poverty
patterns in Italy. The analysis shows that the level of poverty in Italy has remained
relatively stable during the 1997-2005 period, this is however the combined result of
several factors. In particular, poverty rates seem to have increased for individuals
belonging to the younger age classes of the population and decreased for the older
ones and this population patterns display some territorial variation. In addition,
socio-economic variables like the education level appear to have a sensible impact
on the poverty rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, reviews the axiomatic theory of
3poverty measurement. Section 3, analyzes the properties of some of the most
commonly used poverty index functions. Section 4, de￿nes the notion of poverty
ordering and reviews the most important results on the relation between the prop-
erties of the poverty index function and poverty orderings. Section 5, presents the
data used in the empirical application. Section 6, applies the notions of poverty
ordering to the analysis of poverty patterns in Italy in the 1997-2005 period. Sec-
tion 7, presents additional results regarding the decomposition of poverty rates by
population components Conclusions are drawn in section 8.
2 The axiomatic theory
In order to introduce the problem of poverty measurement we begin by assuming
that the problem of identi￿cation has been solved and that there is available
comparable information on the income levels of the individuals belonging to a
given population, along with information on other socio-economic variables that
allow to distribute individuals among di⁄erent population sub-groups. We also
assume that the poverty line is given so that we can identify the poor as those
individuals with a level of income lower than or equal to the poverty line.1
Following the axiomatic approach to the measurement of poverty reviewed in
Foster and Sen (1997), the problem of poverty aggregation can be de￿ned as
the study of the properties that should characterize a poverty measure de￿ned
on the basis of the available information on the distribution of income. These
properties are usually derived from the theory of economic inequality or from
welfare economics.2
In order to present this approach we introduce some preliminary notations and
de￿nitions. Let x = (x1;:::;xn) denote the income distribution vector for a popu-




+ : n 2 N
￿
denotes the set of all possible income distribution
vectors. We are assuming that each individual income is nonnegative. Moreover,
in the following we suppose that individual incomes are disposed by increasing
1The problem of identi￿cation is analyzed at more length in the sections devoted to the
empirical application, where a description of the choices made to develop the empirical analysis
is provided.
2An example of an axiomatic approach to welfare measurement is provided by Sen (1976a),
where the analysis is developed in a multi-commodity framework and the aim is that of pro-
viding measures of economic inequality and aggregate income. The axiomatic approach to the
measurement of poverty was introduced in the literature by Sen (1976b), an early review of this
approach can be found in Kakwani (1980a).
4order, such that x1 ￿ x2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ xn, unless otherwise noted. Finally, given
an income distribution x 2 X we denote with n(x) its population size and with
￿(x) =
Pn(x)
i=1 xi=n(x) the mean income of the population.
For a given distribution x 2 X and a given poverty line z 2 R+, a poverty index is
de￿ned as a real valued function P : X￿R+ ! R, with domain X￿R+ and image
P(x;z) 2 R. We are assuming that the poverty line is a nonnegative real number.
The poverty index aggregates all the relevant economic information regarding the
poor. The set Z = f! 2 R+ : ! ￿ zg de￿nes the poverty domain.
The functional properties of poverty indexes are usually de￿ned with reference
to given changes of the income distribution of a given population of individuals.
Most of the economic literature on poverty measurement has been concerned in
particular with simple increments, rank preserving transfers or combinations of
these two types of transformations. Given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2
X, for a population of n individuals, the income distribution x0 is obtained from
the income distribution x by a simple increment, if x0 ￿ x. Similarly, given two
income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X, for a population of n individuals, the income
distribution x0 is obtained from the income distribution x by a rank preserving
progressive transfer, if there exist individual indexes i;j = 1;:::;n such that
1 ￿ i < j ￿ n, x0
i ￿ xi = xj ￿ x0
j ￿ 0 and x0
k = xk for all k 6= i;j.
The following properties are usually considered desirable for a poverty index:
(P.1) Monotonicity: given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a popu-
lation of a given size n 2 N and a poverty line z 2 R+, if the distribution x0 is
obtained from the distribution x by a simple increment and x0
i ￿ xi for at least
one individual i = 1;:::;n such that xi 2 Z then P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z).
(P.2) (Weak) Transfer: given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a
population of a given size n 2 N and a poverty line z 2 R+, if the distribution
x0 is obtained from the distribution x by a rank preserving progressive transfer
between two individuals i; j = 1;::::n such that xi;xj 2 Z then P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z).
(P.3) Symmetry: given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population
of a given size n 2 N and a poverty line z 2 R+, if the distribution x0 is obtained
from the distribution x by a permutation, such that x0 = ￿x where ￿ is an
n-dimensional permutation matrix, then P(x0;z) = P(x;z).3
(P.4) Focus: given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population of a
given size n 2 N, if x0
i = xi for all i such that xi 2 Z then P(x0;z) = P(x;z).
3An n-dimensional permutation matrix is an n-dimensional square matrix ￿ = [￿ij] with
elements ￿ij for i;j = 1;:::;n, such that for all i = 1;:::;n and all j = 1;:::;n either ￿ij = 0 or
￿ij = 1 and with only one element equal to 1 in each row and in each column of the matrix.
5The property of monotonicity (P.1) states that the poverty index is a decreasing
function of the income of the poor. According to the property of weak transfer
(P.2) a rank preserving progressive transfer of income between the poor implies a
decrease of the poverty measure. The property of symmetry (P.3) is essentially a
condition of anonymity of the poverty index, this is an assumption that is borrowed
from the theory of social choice and it states that the poverty measure should not
depend on whose individuals in the population are the poor, other conditions being
the same. Focus (P.4) requires the poverty measure to be invariant to changes in
the income distribution of the non-poor.4
The following additional properties are often used in many applications:
(P.5) Replication invariance: given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a
population of a given size n 2 N and a poverty line z 2 R+, if the distribution x0
is obtained by replicating the distribution x for k times, such that x0 = (x;:::;x)
and n(x0) = kn(x) where k 2 N, then P(x0;z) = P(x;z).
(P.6) Scale invariance: given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a
population of a given size n 2 N, poverty lines z;z0 2 R+ and a positive real
scalar ￿ 2 R+, if x0 = ￿x and z0 = ￿z then P(x0;z0) = P(x;z).
(P.7) Continuity: the poverty index is a continuous function of the income distri-
bution vector x 2 X and of the poverty line z 2 R+.
(P.8) Additive separability: the poverty index function is an additive separable
function, such that P(x;z) = F(
Pn(x)
i=1 pi(xi;z)), where pi : R+ ￿ R+ ! R, with
domain R+ ￿ R+ and image pi(xi;z) 2 R, is the poverty index function of the
i ￿ th person in the ordered income distribution and F : R ! R is an increasing
real valued function.
The properties of replication and scale invariance (P.5) and (P.6) make the poverty
measure analogous to physical measures of density. According to the former the
poverty measure does not change if the population is replicated k times, the latter
states that the poverty measure is homogeneous of degree 0 in the income distri-
bution vector x 2 X and the poverty line z 2 Z and therefore does not change if
both are scaled by a factor ￿ > 0. Replication invariance is a particular important
property since it allows to extend the poverty comparisons to income distributions
of populations with di⁄erent sizes. Scale invariance is important, because it makes
the poverty measure invariant to nominal variable changes. Finally, the property
4In the theory of social choice the condition of anonimity is usually imposed in order to
make social preference orderings independent of the mapping between individuals and individual
preferences. This is a condition that is usually considered essential for a democratic political
system. For a more extensive discussion see, for instance, Arrow (1963) and Sen (1970).
6of continuity (P.7) is important, because it makes the poverty index well behaved
in the neighborhood of the poverty line.
In order to describe the property of additive separability (P.8), for a given in-
come distribution vector x 2 X and a given poverty line z 2 Z, let q(x;z) =
maxfi : xi ￿ z for i = 1;:::;n(x)g denote the number of the poor in the popu-
lation. The property of additive separability is often combined with other prop-
erties assuming that the individual poverty indexes are equal across poor indi-
viduals. In particular assuming that the individual poverty indexes are de￿ned
as pi(!;z) = p(!;z) for i ￿ q(x;z) and pi(!;z) = 0 for q(x;z) < i ￿ n(x) and






the poverty index measures the average level of poverty in the population.
The poverty index de￿ned in equation (2.1) satis￿es symmetry, focus and repli-
cation invariance by construction. Moreover, the poverty index is decomposable.
Assuming that the population is divided in M sub-groups with di⁄erent socio-
economic characteristics, an letting x = (x1;:::;xM) where xm 2 X is the income
distribution vector of group m, and sm = n(xm)=n(x) for all m = 1;:::;M, it
follows that P(x;z) =
PM
m=1 smP(xm;z), a weighted average of the poverty in-
dexes for each population group, where each sub-group index is de￿ned according
to equation (2.1) and applied to the sub-group income distribution.
More generally, the property of additive separability implies that the poverty index
is sub-group consistent. If the population is divided in di⁄erent sub-groups, the
index increases whenever the poverty index of any population sub-group increases.5
We note ￿nally, that an additional interesting property for a poverty index is
the property of transfer sensitivity. This property requires the e⁄ect of a rank
preserving progressive transfer of income between two individuals that are a given
income distance apart to be greater the lower are the individual income levels.
Although we will later use this property, we do not provide here a formal analysis.6
The properties of a poverty index depend on the assumptions that are made on
the functional form of the poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R. In order
5In an important paper Foster and Shorrocks (1991) have shown that, for a continuous poverty
index and if the individual poverty index functions are equal across poor individuals, the condi-
tion of additive separability is both necessary and su¢ cient for sub-group consistency. Equation
(2.1) shows that decomposability requires some further assumption on the functional form of the
poverty index function.
6For an advanced treatment we refer instead to Shorrocks and Foster (1987), where the
property is analyzed in the context of inequality measurement.
7to characterize the relation between the axiomatic poverty index properties and
the functional form of the poverty index function, we follow an approach that has
previously been used within the theory of economic inequality. Formally, in the
following we assume that the symmetry and focus axioms hold and we partition
the income distribution vector x 2 X in two sub-vectors xP = (x1;:::;xq) and
xNP = (xq+1;:::;xn), where q = q(x;z) represents the number of the poor in the
population, such that x = (xP;xNP). Moreover, for later use, we denote with B a
bistochastic matrix of order n, that takes the block diagonal form B = BP ￿In￿q,
where BP is a bistochastic matrix of order q = q(x;z), In￿q denotes the identity
matrix of order n ￿ q and BP ￿ In￿q denotes the complete product between BP





. We recall here that a bistochastic matrix
of order n is an n-dimensional square matrix B = [bij] with nonnegative elements
bij ￿ 0, such that
Pn
j=1 bij = 1 for all i = 1;:::;n and
Pn
i=1 bij = 1 for all
j = 1;:::;n. A particular example of bistochastic matrix is a permutation matrix.
We introduce the following de￿nitions:
Monotonicity: The poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R is monotonically
decreasing in x 2 X, if and only if given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X
for a population of a given size n 2 N, the condition x0 ￿ x, with x0
i ￿ xi for at
least one i = 1;:::;n such that xi 2 Z, implies P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z).
Schur-convexity: The poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R is Schur-convex
in x 2 X, if and only if given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a
population of a given size n 2 N and a block-diagonal bistochastic matrix B of
order n that takes the form B = BP ￿ In￿q, where BP is a bistochastic matrix of
order q = q(x;z), the condition x0 = Bx implies P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z).
The assumption of monotonicity and the assumption of Schur-convexity are rela-
tively conventional in the theory of economic inequality and can be used to prove
an interesting result concerning the relation between the properties of the poverty
index function P and the poverty axioms:
Lemma 2.1: Given a real valued poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R, with
domain X ￿R+ and image P(x;z) 2 R, and a poverty line z 2 R+ and assuming
that the poverty index satis￿es the properties of symmetry and focus, the following
conditions hold:
(a) the poverty index P(x;z) satis￿es monotonicity if and only if the poverty index
function P is monotonically decreasing;
8(b) it satis￿es weak transfer if and only if P is a Schur-convex function.
Proof: Appendix A.
The de￿nitions of monotonicity and Schur-convexity and the results stated in
Lemma 2.1 show that the assumption of monotonicity is equivalent to the assump-
tion that the poverty index function is monotonically decreasing in the income of
the poor and that the assumption of weak transfer is equivalent to the assumption
of Schur-convexity. These two assumption are therefore analogous to the ones that
are usually imposed on welfare functions in order to capture similar properties.
While the result of Lemma 2.1 is quite general, it can be specialized if more
restrictive assumptions are made on the poverty index function P. In particular,
if P is characterized by additive separability and takes the form de￿ned in equation
(2.1), the properties of the poverty index depend on the speci￿c assumptions that
are made on the individual poverty index function p : R+ ￿ R+ ! R:
Corollary 2.1: Given a poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R with domain
X ￿ R+ and image P(x;z) 2 R and a poverty line z 2 R+, assuming that the
poverty index satis￿es the properties of symmetry, focus and additive separability
and that it takes the form P(x;z) =
Pq(x;z)
i=1 p(xi;z)=n(x), where p : R+￿R+ ! R,
with domain R+ ￿ R+ and image p(xi;z) 2 R, is the individual poverty index
function, the following conditions hold:
(a) the poverty index P(x;z) satis￿es monotonicity if and only if the individual
poverty index function p is monotonically decreasing;
(b) it satis￿es weak transfer if and only if p is convex.
Proof: Appendix A.
In addition to the results stated in Corollary 2.1, the assumption of additive
separability implies that the property of scale invariance is satis￿ed if and only if
the individual index function is homogeneous of degree 0 in the individual income
and the poverty line, such that p(!;z) = p(￿!;￿z) for all ￿ > 0. Moreover,
Corollary 2.1 implies that in the case of a continuously di⁄erentiable individual
index function monotonicity is equivalent to the assumption that @p(!;z)=@! ￿ 0
and weak transfer is equivalent to the assumption that @p(!;z)2=@!2 ￿ 0.7
7Also, for an additively decomposable index of the form de￿ned in equation (2.1) and if the
individual poverty index function is continuosly di⁄erentiable, transfer sensitivity is satis￿ed
if and only if the individual poverty index function is characterized by a decreasing second
derivative.
93 Poverty Indexes
In order to introduce some of the most commonly used poverty indexes, given an
income distribution vector x 2 X and a poverty line z 2 R+, we consider the class
of poverty indexes that are de￿ned as a weighted sum of functions of the individual
poverty gaps (z ￿ xi), or of the individual normalized poverty gaps (z ￿ xi)=z,
for i = 1;:::;n(x). In the ￿rst case, the individual poverty index is de￿ned as
pi(xi;z) = p(z ￿ xi) for i ￿ q(x;z) and pi(x;z) = 0 for q(x;z) < i ￿ n(x) and
in the second case as pi(xi;z) = p((z ￿ xi)=z) for i ￿ q(x;z) and pi(x;z) = 0 for
q(x;z) < i ￿ n(x). These indexes may have the property of additive separability
or take the decomposable form de￿ned in equation (2.1), although this is not a
requirement.
Within the class of poverty indexes that take the form de￿ned in equation (2.1),
the most commonly known is the headcount ratio. For the headcount ratio the
individual poverty index function is de￿ned as an indicator function over the
domain of positive real numbers, with image p(z ￿ xi) = 1 if z ￿ xi ￿ 0 and






The headcount ratio satis￿es the properties of symmetry, focus, replication invari-
ance, scale invariance and decomposability, it does not however satisfy monotonic-
ity, weak transfer and continuity. Increments of income to the poor that do not
change the number of the poor leave the index unchanged and the same result
holds for rank preserving progressive transfers between the poor. Moreover, the
individual poverty index function is not continuous at the level of income given
by the poverty line and this makes the index sensitive to measurement errors.
A second widely used poverty measure is the normalized poverty gap index.
For this index the individual poverty index function is de￿ned by the normal-
ized poverty gap, such that p((z ￿ xi)=z) = (z ￿ xi)=z for i ￿ q(x;z) and









The normalized poverty gap index is equal to the product of the income gap ratio,
I(x;z) = (1 ￿ ￿p(x;z))=z, where ￿p(x;z) =
Pq(x;z)
i=1 xi=q(x;z) is the mean income
of the poor, and of the headcount ratio, such that PG(x;z) = H(x;z)I(x;z). The
10income gap ratio measures the average percentage shortfall from the poverty line
of the incomes of the poor.
The poverty gap index satis￿es the properties of monotonicity, symmetry, focus,
replication invariance, scale invariance, decomposability and continuity, it does not
however satisfy the property of weak transfer, because rank preserving transfers
of income between the poor leave the mean income of the poor unchanged.8
A more general class of poverty indexes is the P￿ class of Foster, Greer and Thor-
becke (1984). The indexes belonging to this class are population averages of the










for ￿ ￿ 0 (3.3)
For ￿ = 0 the poverty index de￿ned in equation (3.3) reduces to the headcount
ratio de￿ned in equation (3.1) and for ￿ = 1 it reduces to the normalized poverty
gap index de￿ned in equation (3.2). In addition, for values of the coe¢ cient
￿ > 1, in the P￿ class of indexes the normalized poverty gaps are weighted by the
normalized poverty gaps themselves raised to a power equal to ￿￿1. This allows
to give a greater weight to the poorer individuals in the income distribution.
The P￿ indexes satisfy symmetry, focus, replication invariance, scale invariance,
decomposability and continuity. Moreover, these indexes satisfy monotonicity for
￿ > 0, since in this case the individual poverty index function is monotonically
decreasing and weak transfer for ￿ > 1, because in this range of values of ￿ the
individual poverty index function is convex.9
For later use, we note that the relation between the headcount ratio, the nor-
malized poverty gap index and the P￿ indexes compiled at di⁄erent values of the
parameter ￿, can also be interpreted in terms of di⁄erent orders of stochastic dom-
inance. The headcount ratio, as a function of the poverty line, is of course an indi-
cator of ￿rst order stochastic dominance. Moreover, the following recursive struc-
8The income gap ratio is often used as an additional indicator to describe the character of
the income distribution of the poor. However, as illustrated in Ravallion (1994), this indicator
presents some drawbacks as a poverty index. Increases of income of the poor that move some
individuals out of poverty may induce an increase of the income gap ratio, because the mean
income of the poor may decrease as a consequence of this type of transformation. More generally,
the income gap ratio is discontinuous in the neighborhood of the poverty line and is therefore
subject to measurement error. The normalized poverty gap index removes both these distortions,
because it makes the index continuous by averaging the normalized income gaps over the size of
the whole population.
9In addition, for ￿ > 2 the P￿ indexes sastify transfer sensitivity and for ￿ ! +1 the
measurement rule de￿ned by the P￿ index converges to the maxmin criterion of welfare, due to
Rawls (1971). In this limiting case the level of poverty is determined by the condition of the
poorest individual in the given income distribution.
11ture holds for the class of P￿ functions: z￿+1P￿+1(x;z) = (￿+1)
R z
0 !￿P￿(x;!)d!.
Letting ￿ = 0 in this expression leads to: zPG(x;z) =
R z
0 H(x;!)d! and shows,
therefore, that the normalized poverty gap index can be interpreted as an indicator
of second order stochastic dominance. Similarly, letting ￿ = 1 and substituting,
it is possible to show that the P2 index can be used as an indicator of third or-
der stochastic dominance. The process can be repeated inde￿nitely for all integer
values of ￿ greater than or equal to 2.
A broader class of poverty indexes, is the class of Generalized Poverty Gap indexes
(GPG), introduced by Jenkins and Lambert (1997). Poverty indexes belonging
to the GPG class are de￿ned as functions of the individual poverty gaps and by
construction satisfy the properties of monotonicity, weak transfer, symmetry, focus
and replication invariance. In addition, most indexes in this class are de￿ned in
terms of the normalized poverty gaps and therefore satisfy also the property of
scale invariance.
In view of the results presented in the previous section, the indexes belonging to
the GPG class are de￿ned by monotonic decreasing, Schur-convex functions of the
income distribution x 2 X, for any given poverty line z 2 R+.
Poverty indexes belonging to the GPG class include the P￿ indexes of Foster,
Greer and Thorbecke (1984) de￿ned in equation (3.3) for parameter ￿ > 1, since
in this case the P￿ function is monotonically decreasing and convex, as well as
other indexes of a similar kind, such as the logarithmic index introduced by Watts
(1968) and Clark, Hemming and Ulph (1981) (second) measure, which is de￿ned
as a variant of the P￿ index function.
The Sen (1976b) index, which is de￿ned as a normalized weighted sum of individual
poverty gaps, also belongs to the GPG class. The weights in the Sen index are
de￿ned by the Borda method of rank ordering, applied to the income distribution
of the poor. The Sen index satis￿es the properties of monotonicity, weak transfer,
symmetry and focus and therefore is a monotonically decreasing, Schur-convex
function of the income distribution of the poor. The Sen index also satis￿es
replication invariance and scale invariance, however, it does not satisfy additive
separability and continuity.10
10It should also be noted that the Sen index does not satisfy the property of transfer sensitivity.
A modi￿cation of the index that satis￿es this property has been proposed by Kakwani (1980b).
In this modi￿ed version the weights are raised to a power k 2 N, large enough for the resulting
index to satisfy the required property. Moreover, the property of replication invariance holds
actually only asymptotically. A modi￿cation of the Sen index that satis￿es continuity has been
proposed by Shorrocks (1995), and is obtained replacing the given income distribution x 2 X
by the income distribution truncated at the level of the poverty line z 2 R+.
124 Poverty orderings
Following the analysis of the previous sections, given an income distribution x 2 X
and a poverty line z 2 R+, poverty indexes that satisfy desirable axiomatic prop-
erties can be de￿ned by imposing particular restrictions on the poverty index
function. However, when comparing poverty across di⁄erent income distributions,
the indications given by di⁄erent poverty indexes may be di⁄erent, even assuming
that the indexes satisfy the same properties. Similarly, for a given poverty index
function, the comparison between the poverty levels of di⁄erent income distribu-
tions may vary with the choice of the poverty line.
Results advanced in Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks (1988b, 1988c),
show that it is possible to characterize the conditions that make poverty indexes
with similar properties order di⁄erent income distributions by poverty level in the
same way and such that the resulting poverty ordering is de￿ned for a range of
poverty lines, or for a subset of the real line. In these studies it is also shown that
the concept of poverty ordering can be related to di⁄erent notions of stochastic
dominance between income distributions.11
In order to review the most important results in this ￿eld, we introduce the concept
of poverty ordering for a given class of poverty indexes P and a given admissible
range of poverty lines Z ￿ R+. Let P(Z) denote the poverty ordering related
to the class of poverty indexes P and the range of poverty lines Z. The poverty
ordering de￿nes a relation between di⁄erent income distribution vectors for a pop-
ulation of a given size. In particular, given income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X
for a population of size n 2 N, we read x0P(Z)x as: "The income distribution
x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distribution x 2 X for the class of poverty
index functions P in the range of poverty lines Z.".
The poverty relation is de￿ned formally as follows:
Poverty ordering: Given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population
of a given size n 2 N, a class of poverty indexes P and a range of poverty lines
Z ￿ R+, the poverty ordering P(Z) is de￿ned such that x0P(Z)x if and only
if P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z) for all poverty index functions P 2 P and all poverty lines
z 2 Z.
Therefore, the income distribution x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distri-
11A review of the theory of stochastic dominance applied to the subject of inequality and
poverty measurement is provided in Davidson and Duclos (2000). The relation between the
theory of economic inequality and poverty measurement is described also in Foster and Shorrocks
(1988a).
13bution x 2 X in the class of poverty indexes P and for the range of poverty
lines Z ￿ R+, if and only if the poverty index for income distribution x0 2 X
is lower than or equal to the poverty index for income distribution x 2 X for all
poverty index functions in the class P and all poverty lines in the admissible range
Z ￿ R+.12
We restrict the analysis, as in previous sections, to functions that satisfy the
symmetry and focus axioms and assume that the admissible range of poverty lines
takes the form of a closed interval, such that Z ￿ [z￿;z+] where z￿;z+ 2 R+
denote the lower and upper bounds of the admissible range.
We consider in particular the class of poverty index functions that are monotonic
decreasing in x 2 X:
P1 ￿ fP : X ￿ R+ ! R : P is monotone decreasing in x 2 Xg
and the class of poverty index functions that are monotonic decreasing and Schur-
convex in x 2 X:
P2 ￿ fP : X ￿ R+ ! R: P 2 P1 and P is Schur-convex in x 2 Xg
In the de￿nition of the poverty index classes P1 and P2, the assumption that
the poverty indexes belonging to each class satisfy the properties of symmetry
and focus is made implicitly. The de￿nitions also imply that the class of poverty
indexes P2 is a sub-class of the class of poverty indexes P1, such that for a given
poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R, P 2 P2 implies that P 2 P1 while the
converse does not necessarily hold, and therefore P2 ￿ P1.
The results presented in Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks (1988b, 1988c)
imply that there is an equivalence relation between the poverty ordering de￿ned
by the class of poverty indexes P1, transformations of a given income distribution
x 2 X in a income distribution x0 2 X through simple increments and the notion
of ￿rst order stochastic dominance. The result is stated formally in the following
theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Atkinson (1987), Foster and Shorrocks (1988b, 1988c)): Given two
income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population of a given size n 2 N,
the class of poverty index functions P1 and an admissible range of poverty lines
12Given proper classes of poverty index functions a poverty ordering de￿ned in this way is
re￿ exive, transitive and antisymmetric and therefore de￿nes a partial ordering in the convention
adopted in Sen (1970). For an introduction to the notion of ordering relation see also Kreps
(1988).
14Z ￿ [z￿;z+]￿R+, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) the income distribution x0 2 X is obtained from the income distribution x 2 X
through a sequence of simple increments, such that x0 ￿ x and x0
i ￿ xi for at least
one individual i = 1;:::;n such that xi 2 Z for some z 2 Z;
(b) the income distribution x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distribution
x 2 X for the class of poverty indexes P1 and the range of poverty lines Z:
x0P1(Z)x;
(c) there is a ￿rst order stochastic dominance relation between the income distri-
bution x0 2 X and the income distribution x 2 X such that H(x0;z) ￿ H(x;z)
for all poverty lines z 2 [0;z+].
Proof: Appendix A.
We note that while the poverty ordering relation corresponding to the class of
poverty index functions P1 is de￿ned for a subset of the real line that takes the
form of a closed interval Z ￿ [z￿;z+] ￿ R+, the ￿rst order stochastic dominance
relation is de￿ned in correspondence of the closed half line [0;z+]. This follows
since the poverty ordering is the intersection quasi-ordering derived from the class
of monotonic poverty index functions P1. Instead, the stochastic dominance re-
lation is de￿ned with reference to the headcount ratio. The extension of the
dominance condition to the closed half line [0;z+], allows therefore to restrict
the partial ordering de￿ned by the headcount ratio, conformably to the poverty
ordering de￿ned by the set of monotonic poverty index functions.
Theorem 4.1 admits an important characterization in relation to the class of
monotone decreasing and additive separable poverty index functions that take the









The class of poverty indexes P0
1 is a sub-class of the class of poverty indexes P1,
since for a given poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R, P 2 P0
1 implies that
P 2 P1 while the converse does not necessarily hold, and therefore P0
1 ￿ P1.
There exist an equivalence relation between the poverty ordering de￿ned by the
class of poverty indexes P0
1 and the notion of ￿rst order stochastic dominance:
Corollary 4.1: Given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population
of a given size n 2 N, the class of poverty index functions P0
1 and an admissible
range of poverty lines Z ￿ [z￿;z+]￿R+, the following conditions are equivalent:
15(a) the income distribution x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distribution
x 2 X for the class of poverty indexes P0
1 and the range of poverty lines Z:
x0P0
1(Z)x;
(b) there is a ￿rst order stochastic dominance relation between the income distri-
bution x0 2 X and the income distribution x 2 X such that H(x0;z) ￿ H(x;z)
for all poverty lines z 2 [0;z+].
Proof: Appendix A.
This result is particularly important since it shows that given two income distrib-
utions, if a poverty ordering relation can be established for the class of monotone
decreasing and additive separable poverty index functions that take the form
(2.1), then the same poverty ordering relation holds for the more general class
of monotone decreasing functions. Therefore, if the purpose of the analysis is
that of making ordinal comparisons, the analysis can be restricted to the class of
poverty index functions P0
1.
The results presented in Atkinson (1987) and Foster and Shorrocks (1988b, 1988c)
also imply that there is an equivalence relation between the poverty ordering
de￿ned by the class of poverty indexes P2, transformations of a given income
distribution x 2 X in an income distribution x0 2 X through simple increments
and rank preserving progressive transfers and the notion of second order stochastic
dominance. The result is stated formally as follows:
Theorem 4.2 (Atkinson (1987), Foster and Shorrocks (1988b, 1988c)): Given two
income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population of a given size n 2 N,
the class of poverty index functions P2 and an admissible range of poverty lines
Z ￿ [z￿;z+]￿R+, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) the income distribution x0 2 X is obtained from the income distribution x 2 X
through a sequence of simple increments and rank preserving progressive transfers
such that x0 ￿ Bx, where B is an appropriate bistochastic matrix of order n;
(b) the income distribution x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distribution
x 2 X for the class of poverty indexes P2 and the range of poverty lines Z:
x0P2(Z)x;
(c) there is a second order stochastic dominance relation between the income
distribution x0 2 X and the income distribution x 2 X such that PG(x0;z) ￿
PG(x;z) for all poverty lines z 2 [0;z+].
Proof: Appendix A.
16We note again that the poverty ordering relation corresponding the class of poverty
index functions P2 is de￿ned for a subset of the real line that takes the form of
a closed interval Z ￿ [z￿;z+] ￿ R+, while the second order stochastic dominance
relation is de￿ned with reference to the closed half line [0;z+]. This follows since
the poverty ordering is the intersection quasi-ordering resulting from the class of
monotonic decreasing and Schur-convex poverty index functions P2. The stochas-
tic dominance relation is de￿ned instead with reference to the normalized poverty
gap index. The extension of the dominance condition to the closed half line [0;z+],
allows therefore to restrict the partial ordering de￿ned by the normalized poverty
gap index, conformably to the poverty ordering de￿ned by the set of monotonic
and Schur-convex poverty index functions.
Theorem 4.2 admits an important characterization for the class of monotone de-
creasing, Schur-convex and additively separable functions that take the form (2.1).









The class of poverty indexes P0
2 is a sub-class of the class of poverty indexes P2
since for a given poverty index function P : X ￿ R+ ! R, P 2 P0
2 implies that
P 2 P2 while the converse does not necessarily hold, and therefore P0
2 ￿ P2.
There exist an equivalence relation between the poverty ordering de￿ned by the
class of poverty indexes P0
2 and the notion of second order stochastic dominance:
Corollary 4.2: Given two income distribution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population
of a given size n 2 N, the class of poverty index functions P0
2 and an admissible
range of poverty lines Z ￿R+, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) the income distribution x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distribution
x 2 X for the class of poverty indexes P0
2 and the range of poverty lines Z:
x0P0
2(Z)x;
(b) there is a second order stochastic dominance relation between the income
distribution x0 2 X and the income distribution x 2 X such that PG(x0;z) ￿
PG(x;z) for all poverty lines z 2 [0;z+].
Proof: Appendix A.
This result is important because it shows that given two income distributions, if a
poverty ordering relation can be established for the class of monotone decreasing,
Schur-convex and additive separable poverty index functions that take the form
17de￿ned in (2.1), then the same poverty ordering relation holds for the more gen-
eral class of monotone decreasing and Schur-convex functions. Therefore, if the
purpose of the analysis is that of making ordinal comparisons, the analysis can be
restricted to the class of poverty index functions P0
2.
We note ￿nally, that the structure of the results presented in theorems 4.1 and 4.2
is similar to the one that characterizes the analogous results that were proposed
within the theory of economic inequality in Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta, Sen and
Starrett (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973). These works were concerned
with ￿nding a relation between the inequality partial orderings that can be de-
￿ned from the sets of welfare functions that have well de￿ned monotonicity and
concavity properties and the notion of Lorenz dominance. They showed that for
income distributions that have the same mean income, the inequality ordering de-
￿ned by the set of Schur-concave welfare functions is equivalent to the inequality
ordering relation de￿ned by the Lorenz curve. These results were later extended in
Shorrocks (1983), where in order to allow for comparisons of income distributions
with di⁄erent mean income the notion of generalized Lorenz dominance is intro-
duced. The results in this latter work show that the inequality ordering de￿ned by
the set of monotonic increasing and Schur-concave welfare functions is equivalent
to the inequality ordering relation de￿ned by the generalized Lorenz curve.
The results reviewed in theorems 4.1 and 4.2 imply that there is a close relation
between the study of economic inequality and the analysis of poverty, since the
notion of generalized Lorenz dominance can be related to the notions of ￿rst
order and second order stochastic dominance. Note, however, that within the
poverty domain the comparison between di⁄erent income distributions requires
the de￿nition of an admissible range of poverty lines. Given the range of poverty
lines the comparison is then restricted to a partition of the income distribution, a
feature that adds additional dimensions to the analysis.
5 The Data
We use as main source of data the Household Budget Survey (HBS) which is
carried out on a representative sample of Italian households by the Italian National
Statistical Institute (Istat) on an annual basis.
The HBS is conducted yearly with the purpose of measuring the structure and
level of household consumption expenditure and to relate the observed household
consumption expenditure patterns to the most important household characteris-
18tics, such as the household socio-economic status and its location in the Italian
territory.
The statistical unit of analysis of the HBS is the household, de￿ned by Istat (2006a)
as a group of persons living together and characterized by a family relationship.
For each household every person living normally within the family is considered
an household member. The population of the HBS is de￿ned by all the households
that are regularly resident in Italy at the time of the survey.13
The main economic variable reported by the HBS is the household consumption
expenditure on goods and services. For each household, additional information
regarding the household characteristics is also provided. Household characteristics
include informations on gender, age, education and employment status of each
individual member of the household, a description of the housing arrangements
and of the main features of other housing ownerships and measures of household￿ s
income and savings.
The survey data are used for the determination of the private consumption expen-
diture component in the national income and product accounts and for the o¢ cial
governmental estimates of relative poverty.
In each year a sample of about 28.000 families is surveyed and interviews are
conducted monthly on randomly selected households. For each household in the
sample the survey reports the monthly average household expenditure along with
the information on the household characteristics.14
In order to develop the analysis of poverty patterns in Italy for the 1997-2005
period we follow a variant of the methodology employed by Istat (2006b) to provide
the annual o¢ cial estimates of relative poverty.
Given the structure of the survey data, we take household consumption expendi-
ture as the basic indicator of individual welfare. Following the o¢ cial de￿nition,
we measure household consumption net of expenditure for extraordinary house-
hold maintenance, life insurance and perpetual rents premiums and mortgages
repayments and loan refunds.
There are several advantages in using household consumption expenditure as an
indicator of individual welfare. Household consumption expenditure can be re-
13For the purposes of the survey Istat (2006a) adopts a broad notion of family, that is de￿ned
as a group of persons living together and characterized by a relationship of care, marriage,
parenthood, a¢ nity, adoption or tutorship.
14The sampling design of the HBS is composed of two stages. The ￿rst stage is strati￿ed
according to territorial location, in order to ensure that all provinces are covered by the survey.
The sampling units at the ￿rst stage are the municipalities. In the second stage the sampling
units are the households, selected by simple random sampling out of the civic lists. In each
month 231 municipalities and an average of 2350 households are involved with the survey.
19garded as preferred to income as a measure of welfare, because according to
the life-cycle/permanent income theory of consumption it is an indicator of the
household￿ s life time resources. Moreover, the survey information on household
consumption is more accurate than the corresponding information on household
income, since the purpose of the survey is to measure household consumption.15
We convert the consumption expenditures of households with di⁄erent socio-
economic characteristics in comparable units using the equivalence scale intro-
duced by Buhmann et. al. (1988) in the context of the Luxembourg Income
Study (LIS). This equivalence scale adjusts household consumption expenditure
for household size, dividing household consumption expenditure by households
size raised to a power ￿ 2 [0;1]. For ￿ = 0 this amounts to using household con-
sumption expenditure without adjustment, while for ￿ = 1 the indicator of eco-
nomic welfare is household￿ s per-capita consumption. In the intermediate range
the equivalence scale results in an indicator of economic welfare, that takes into
account of the economies of scale enjoyed by the individual members of a given
household, living together and therefore sharing common resources.
A research work by Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) shows that with
a parameter ￿ = 0:5 the power equivalence scale provides a reasonable approxi-
mation to the equivalence scales used in many di⁄erent OECD countries for the
purposes of inequality and poverty comparisons. The square root scale is also close
to the OECD and modi￿ed OECD equivalence scales, that take into account both
of household size and of household composition, and it provides an approximation
to the equivalence scale used by Istat (2006b) for the compilation of the o¢ cial
governmental poverty estimates, which is derived using the Engel method.16
We take as unit of analysis the individual and de￿ne the poverty line at one half of
the household average equivalent consumption expenditure. We consider as poor
all individuals that live in households with equivalent consumption expenditure
lower than or equal to the poverty line.
15Reviews of the theory of consumption that are useful for the present purposes are provided
in Deaton (1992, 1997). For some considerations on the subject of the choice between income
and consumption for the measurement of economic welfare see also Abul Naga (2005).
16In an important study Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins (1992) have shown, with reference to
the power scale, that measures of income inequality and poverty display a tendency towards a
U-shaped pattern, as the parameter ￿ varies between 0 and 1, reaching a minimum when the
parameter is in the range of 0:5. Their analysis shows that the choice of the power parameter can
have important implications for both income inequality and poverty comparisons. In the present
study we adopt a parameter ￿ = 0:5, because this is the conventional choice made in several
studies in this ￿eld. For a more general discussion of the subject of the choice of equivalence scale
see among others Atkinson (1983, 1992), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Deaton (1997).
206 Poverty in Italy in the 1997-2005 period
Table 1 reports the estimates of the headcount ratio, the income gap ratio and the
poverty gap prevailing in each area in 2005 and the variations of these measures
occurred during the 1997-2005 period. The ￿rst panel of the table shows that in
2005 the headcount ratio in Italy is on average equal to 15.8 per cent, a ￿gure that
re￿ ects however wide regional di⁄erences.
In the same year the income gap ratio is equal to 22.6 per cent while di⁄erences
across macro-regions appear less pronounced for this quantity.
The poverty gap is equal to 3.6 per cent and the regional di⁄erences for this
indicator re￿ ect the ones observed for the headcount ratio.
The second panel of the table shows that during the 1997-2005 period there has
been a tendency for the headcount ratio to decrease in the northern and central
regions and to increase in the southern ones, as a result the headcount ratio has
remained relatively stable in the national average. In the same period, similar
movements are observed for the poverty gap.17
The last columns of the table reports the population share of each macro-region,
along with the poor share and the share of the cumulative income gap of each area.
The table shows that while the Italian population is relatively evenly distributed
across macro-regions, the poor appear to be relatively concentrated. The southern
regions account for 68.6 per cent of the Italian poor and the cumulative income
gap for these regions amounts to 73.5 per cent.
In order to assess the sensitivity of these results to the choice of the poverty index,
table 2 reports for each macro-region the headcount ratio, the poverty gap index
and the P￿ indexes with parameter ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 3 for each year in the 1997-2005
period.
The indexes reported in the table con￿rm the view that relative poverty has re-
mained relatively stable during the 1997-2005 period. The di⁄erences in poverty
levels across macro-regions appear to be more important.
Table 2 also reports the poverty lines for each year in the 1997-2005 period, mea-
sured at constant 2000 prices. These quantities are obtained by dividing the
nominal poverty lines computed from the HBS with the methodology illustrated
in the previous section, with the private consumption expenditure implicit de-
17It is interesting to note that in the 1997-2005 period the income gap ratio decreases in
the North and in the South and increases in the Centre. This indicator seems to be thus
characterized by the sort of measurement error problems described in previous sections. We
should also mention that all reported ￿gures in the present application should be taken with the
bene￿t of hindsight, because they are characterized by statistical uncertainty and the information
currently released by Istat does not allow us to compute standard errors.
21￿ ator. The reported poverty lines show that during the 1997-2005 period the
average household consumption expenditure has remained relatively constant in
real terms.18
When interpreting these data attention should be paid to the implications of de￿n-
ing the poverty line as a fraction of average equivalent household consumption
expenditure. The use of a relative poverty line implies that movements in average
equivalent consumption expenditure over time are assumed away in the compu-
tations, therefore comparisons of poverty over time re￿ ect only movements in the
distribution of equivalent consumption expenditure. However, since the poverty
line is de￿ned as a fraction of a national average, comparisons of poverty across
areas re￿ ect both di⁄erences in average equivalent consumption expenditure and
di⁄erences in the distribution of equivalent consumption expenditure.19
In order to further investigate the movements over time in the poverty rate, we
computed for each macro-region the headcount ratio for levels of the poverty
line ranging from 20 per cent to 60 per cent of average household equivalent
consumption expenditure. The resulting distribution curve for Italy is depicted
in ￿gure 1 and is reproduced, along with the distributions curves for each macro-
region, in appendix B (table B.1).
The ￿gure shows that the headcount ratio in the year 2005 is slightly lower than in
the year 1997 for all levels of the poverty line. According to the results described
in previous sections, the headcount ratio can be interpreted as an indicator of
￿rst order stochastic dominance, if it is considered as a function of the poverty
line. The results depicted in ￿gure 1 and reproduced in table B.1 show that the
condition of ￿rst order stochastic dominance between the income distributions in
1997 and 2005 holds for Italy.
The headcount ratio curves for the macro-regions reported in table B.1 show that
the ￿rst order stochastic dominance condition holds also for the North, where the
headcount ratio decreases between 1997 and 2005 for all levels of the poverty line,
but is not satis￿ed neither for the Centre nor for the South. However, the area
under the headcount ratio curve as a function of the poverty line is an indicator
18The private consumption expenditure de￿ ator is taken from the recent revision of the na-
tional income and product accounts, that was released by Istat (2005).
19The implications of the adoption of a relative poverty line can be tested by using as an
absolute line a relative poverty line de￿ned with reference to a given year and updated for
other years in real terms. In this application we used as absolute line the relative poverty line
for the last year of the sample period. As shown in table 2 this poverty line is equal to a
monthly expenditure of 675.7 euros per person at constant 2000 prices. The results do not di⁄er
substantially from the ones reported, given the small di⁄erences that actually occur in each year
between the relative poverty line and the absolute line.
22of second order stochastic dominance, since for each level of the poverty line this
area is equal to the product between the poverty gap index and the poverty line,
zPG(x;z). From graphical inspection of the headcount ration curves for the Centre
and the South we are able to conclude that a condition of second order stochastic
dominance does hold for both macro-regions. As indicated by the second order
dominance conditions, in the Centre the poverty level displays a decrease between
1997 and 2005 and in the South an increase.
Finally, the headcount ratio curves in table B.1, show that there are stochas-
tic dominance relations between the income distribution of the di⁄erent macro-
regions. In particular, in each year of the sample period there appear to hold ￿rst
order stochastic dominance relations between the income distribution of the North
and the income distributions of the Centre or of the South. In 1997, however, the
stochastic dominance relation between the North and the Centre is only a second
order one. Moreover, there is in each year of the sample period a ￿rst order sto-
chastic dominance relation between the income distribution of the Centre and the
income distribution of the South.
These results are broadly consistent with the ones reported in Table 2, though
the latter ones do not display the variation in dominance conditions that can be
inferred from the headcount ratio curves.
The movements in the distribution of equivalent consumption expenditure can
be further analyzed decomposing the population by population components and
analyzing the behavior of the headcount ratio for each population component. We
consider here in particular the population decomposition by age and distinguish
between the age classes of individuals with 24 years or less, 25-34 years, 35-44
years, 45-54 years and 55 years of age or more.
The headcount ratio curves, as functions of a poverty line ranging from 20 to 60
per cent of average household equivalent consumption expenditure, are reproduced
for each age class, for each year of the sample period 1997-2005, in appendix B
(table B.2). Graphical examination of the curves shows that during the sample
period the poverty rate has a tendency to increase for the age classes of individuals
with less than 24 years, 25-34 years and 35-44 years and to decrease for the age
classes of individuals with 45-54 years and 55 years or more. However, between
1997 and 2005 there are only second order stochastic dominance relations for the
￿rst three age classes and for the 45-54 age class. There is instead a ￿rst order
stochastic dominance relation for the age class of individuals with 55 years of
age or more. The headcount ratio curve for the 35-44 age class is depicted for
illustrative purposes in ￿gure 2.
23These results are quite striking, since they occur during a period of economic
reforms, that have substantially increased the ￿ exibility of the labor market and
the accountability of the pensions system in Italy. A decomposition of the patterns
of the headcount ratio by age class and macro-region shows, that the decrease in
poverty for the older individuals is concentrated in the regions of the North and
of the Centre while the increase for the younger individuals is concentrated in
the South. The decomposition of poverty by age class therefore seems to provide
an explanation to the changes in poverty rates that are observed in the di⁄erent
macro-regions in the period 1997-2005.
7 Poverty indexes by population components
The property of decomposability of the poverty index function can be used to pro-
vide further evidence on the impact of di⁄erent socio-economic factors on the level
of poverty. We consider in this case, in addition to the population decomposition
by age, the population decompositions by gender and by years of education and
analyze the behavior of the sub-group poverty indexes along these dimensions. The
population decomposition by gender distinguishes between males and females, the
decomposition by years of education is provided for individuals between 25 and
54 years of age and distinguishes between the educational levels represented by
primary and secondary school, high school and university.20
Tables 3 and 4 report for each macro-region and the years 1997 and 2005 the pop-
ulation decompositions for each socio-economic dimension. The poverty indexes
considered in the tables are as above the headcount ratio, the poverty gap index
and the P￿ indexes for parameter ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 3. The ￿rst panel of each table
reports the sub-group indexes for each population component. The second panel
reports the population shares by socio-economic component and, for each poverty
index function, the contribution share of each sub-group index to the overall index.
With reference to the population decomposition by gender, we note that, in both
the reference and the comparison year, there appears to be a tendency for the
poverty level to be lower for the male component and greater for the female one.
20According to the survey data, the fraction of the population composed by individuals that
don￿ t have a degree is very small in all geographical areas. Therefore, in the primary school
category we include all individuals with at most a primary school degree, including those that
have not yet achieved this educational level. We follow in this way the o¢ cial methodology
employed by Istat (2006b), because considering individuals with no degree as a separate category
would not lead to statistically signi￿cant inferences, given the sampling size of this sub-group of
the population.
24The male component accounts also for a lower share of the population. These
di⁄erences imply, that the contribution share of the male component to the overall
poverty rate, is smaller than the corresponding share of the female one. These
results are common to each macro-region.
The population decomposition by age shows that the level of poverty is charac-
terized by a typical pattern. The poverty rates take intermediate values for the
class of individuals with less than 24 years of age, decline with the age class reach-
ing a minimum for the 45-54 age class and take the greatest values for the class
of individuals with 55 years of age or more. This age pattern is common across
macro-regions in both 1997 and 2005 and admits a life-cycle interpretation once
long term movements in productivity and labor market and other imperfections
are taken into account.
In particular, the intermediate poverty level that characterizes the age class of
individuals with 24 years or less, can in our view be explained mainly with reference
to features of the labor market, which in Italy severely adversely a⁄ects the younger
cohorts. Similarly, the poverty level for the population with 55 years of age or
more is determined by several factors. Most importantly, individuals in this age
class belong to the older cohorts of the population and are therefore on average
characterized by a lower income relatively to the younger cohorts. In addition,
the disposable income for individuals in this age class declines as a consequence
of retirement.
The tables also show that in both 1997 and 2005 the contribution share of in-
dividuals with 24 years of age or less is lower than the national average in the
North and in the Centre and greater than the national average in the South. At
the same time the contribution share of individuals in the age group of 55 years
or more tends to be greater than the national average in the North and in the
Centre and lower than the national average in the South. These results are partly
explained by population structure prevailing in each macro-region, the North and
the Centre being characterized by a relatively older population and the South by
a relatively younger one.
For the group of individuals with 25-54 years of age, the decomposition by level
of educational attainment provides some additional interesting information on the
structural features of poverty in Italy. The tables show that in each macro-region
the poverty rates decrease with the educational level. Moreover, the di⁄erences
between the poverty rates prevailing at di⁄erent levels of educational attainment
appear to be very substantial. In both 1997 and 2005 the di⁄erence between
the headcount ratio of individuals in the 25-54 age class that have at most a
25primary school degree and the one prevailing for individuals in the same age class
with university education is of the order of 20 percentage points. This in turn
implies, that while the share of individuals in the 25-54 age class with a primary or
secondary school degree is at most of the order of ￿fty per cent, the contribution to
overall poverty of individuals belonging to these educational classes is of the order
of seventy percent. The comparisons by macro-region also reveal that poverty
rates tend to be relatively higher in the Centre and in the South in all of the
educational classes and substantially so in the South.
These ￿gures show that policies aimed at reducing poverty in Italy should be tar-
geted towards the groups of less educated individuals. This consideration is per-
haps reinforced considering that the levels of educational attainment have shown a
tendency to increase during the sample period, such that in the ￿nal year despite
variations in all macro-regions a greater share of the population is accounted for
by individuals with high school or university education 21
8 Conclusions
The paper reviews the economic literature on poverty measurement, paying special
attention to the analysis of the desirable properties of the poverty index function
and of the implications of these properties for the notion of poverty ordering.
The previous research in this ￿eld has been mainly concerned with describing the
relation between the level and distribution of income and the level of poverty. The
analysis presented in the paper reviews the main elements of this relation using
well-known results in the theory of economic inequality.
The paper includes an empirical application to the analysis of poverty patterns in
Italy in the 1997-2005 period. The main source of data used for this application
is the Household Budget Survey, conducted yearly by the Italian National Sta-
tistical Institute on a representative sample of Italian households. The empirical
application uses as basic measure of economic welfare household consumption ex-
penditure. The LIS-OECD square root equivalence scale is used to convert the
consumption expenditure of households with di⁄erent socio-economic characteris-
tics in comparable units and the analysis of poverty is then performed at the level
21According to the information on educational attainament provided in the HBS the average
years of schooling between 1997 and 2005 the average years of schooling have increased in the
national average by almost one year from 12.0 to 12.8. This trend has been common to all
regions though the increase has been relatively greater in the North and in the Centre.
26of the individual household member. The reference poverty line is de￿ned at one
half of the average household equivalent consumption expenditure.
An analysis of stochastic dominance conditions is also carried out letting the
poverty line vary between 20 per cent and 60 per cent of the average household
equivalent consumption expenditure.
The main ￿ndings of the empirical analysis are that the income distribution has
remained relatively stable during the 1997-2005 period in Italy however this occurs
as a result of di⁄erent patterns by macro-region. Poverty rates have shown a
tendency to decline in the North and in the Centre and to increase in the South.
Moreover, the decomposition by population components shows that poverty rates
have increased in the younger age classes and decreased in the older ones. Since
there are variations in the age structure of the population by macro-region the
decomposition of poverty patterns by age components provides an explanation for
the observed di⁄erences in the movements of poverty during the sample period.
Additional analysis shows that in all macro-regions socio-economic factors such as
the level of educational attainment have a distinguishable e⁄ect on the poverty
rates and suggests that poverty reducing policies should be primarily directed
towards the less educated individuals
27Tables and ￿gures














North 0.073 0.186 0.014 0.452 0.209 - 0.172
Centre 0.087 0.200 0.017 0.192 0.105 - 0.093
South 0.306 0.242 0.074 0.356 0.686 - 0.735
Italy 0.158 0.226 0.036 1.000 1.000 - 1.000
North -0.011 -0.018 -0.004 0.003 -0.024 - -0.036
Centre -0.011 0.014 -0.001 0.004 -0.008 - 0.001
South 0.012 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.032 - 0.035
Italy -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 - - - -
growth 1997-2005
levels
Poverty Indexes Poverty Shares
Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The population estimates are reported in thousands. The headcount ratio and the
income gap ratio are compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure as indicator of
economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in equivalent units
using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty line is set at
0.5 times average equivalent consumption expenditure. Shares represent the fraction of
poor accounted for by each macro-region for the headcount ratio and the fraction of the
cumulative income gap accounted by each macro-region for the poverty gap.Table 2: Poverty indexes by macro-region, 1997-2005
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
H 0.084 0.083 0.078 0.087 0.076 0.081 0.082 0.073 0.073
PG 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.013 0.014
P2 0.0056 0.0053 0.0048 0.0053 0.0043 0.0050 0.0053 0.0041 0.0041
P3 0.0023 0.0021 0.0020 0.0021 0.0016 0.0020 0.0022 0.0015 0.0016
H 0.098 0.111 0.123 0.147 0.129 0.106 0.091 0.105 0.087
PG 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.022 0.018 0.020 0.017
P2 0.0057 0.0073 0.0086 0.0101 0.0074 0.0069 0.0056 0.0060 0.0055
P3 0.0023 0.0030 0.0035 0.0042 0.0027 0.0028 0.0022 0.0023 0.0021
H 0.293 0.289 0.289 0.298 0.297 0.276 0.268 0.303 0.306
PG 0.072 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.072 0.067 0.064 0.076 0.074
P2 0.0257 0.0270 0.0277 0.0274 0.0257 0.0239 0.0229 0.0280 0.0269
P3 0.0111 0.0122 0.0124 0.0121 0.0112 0.0104 0.0100 0.0123 0.0119
H 0.163 0.163 0.162 0.174 0.165 0.156 0.150 0.161 0.158
PG 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.037 0.036
P2 0.0129 0.0135 0.0138 0.0142 0.0125 0.0122 0.0117 0.0130 0.0125
P3 0.0055 0.0059 0.0060 0.0061 0.0053 0.0052 0.0050 0.0055 0.0054





Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The poverty indexes are compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure
as indicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in
equivalent unites using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty
line is set at 0.5 times average equivalent consumption expenditure and is reported in
monthly euro at constant 2000 prices.Table 3a: Poverty indexes by socio-economic dimension and macro-region, 1997








H 0.076 0.092 0.065 0.066 0.063 0.048 0.136 0.104 0.080 0.037 0.017
PG 0.015 0.020 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.031 0.022 0.014 0.006 0.003
P2 0.0046 0.0066 0.0032 0.0034 0.0037 0.0026 0.0110 0.0075 0.0042 0.0016 0.0008
P3 0.0018 0.0028 0.0011 0.0012 0.0014 0.0010 0.0048 0.0033 0.0016 0.0005 0.0003
H 0.094 0.101 0.081 0.071 0.066 0.079 0.147 0.130 0.100 0.048 0.020
PG 0.017 0.019 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.030 0.030 0.018 0.006 0.002
P2 0.0053 0.0059 0.0034 0.0032 0.0030 0.0055 0.0096 0.0119 0.0053 0.0015 0.0002
P3 0.0022 0.0024 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011 0.0027 0.0040 0.0065 0.0019 0.0005 0.0000
H 0.277 0.309 0.280 0.273 0.262 0.226 0.377 0.426 0.317 0.162 0.070
PG 0.066 0.077 0.065 0.062 0.061 0.054 0.104 0.113 0.073 0.032 0.014
P2 0.0234 0.0279 0.0218 0.0200 0.0207 0.0191 0.0412 0.0426 0.0239 0.0097 0.0037
P3 0.0101 0.0121 0.0090 0.0080 0.0087 0.0081 0.0192 0.0192 0.0096 0.0036 0.0012
H 0.153 0.172 0.162 0.142 0.135 0.112 0.212 0.237 0.171 0.079 0.035
PG 0.034 0.040 0.035 0.030 0.029 0.025 0.053 0.060 0.037 0.014 0.006
P2 0.0116 0.0142 0.0114 0.0094 0.0096 0.0085 0.0200 0.0223 0.0117 0.0042 0.0016






Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The poverty indexes are compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure
as indicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in
equivalent unites using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty
line is set at 0.5 times average equivalent consumption expenditure. The decomposition
by educational level considers only individuals in the 25-54 age class. Panel 3a reports
the sub-group indexes by socio-economic dimension, panel 3b reports the contribution
share of each sub-group index to the overall index.Table 3b: Poverty indexes by socio-economic dimension and macro-region, 1997








Pop. share 0.485 0.515 0.237 0.166 0.145 0.142 0.311 0.132 0.361 0.409 0.098
H 0.439 0.561 0.181 0.130 0.109 0.080 0.500 0.230 0.489 0.254 0.028
PG 0.413 0.587 0.156 0.113 0.100 0.070 0.561 0.267 0.481 0.228 0.024
P2 0.395 0.605 0.133 0.100 0.095 0.065 0.607 0.306 0.469 0.202 0.023
P3 0.385 0.615 0.114 0.090 0.090 0.064 0.642 0.349 0.455 0.174 0.022
Pop. share 0.485 0.515 0.256 0.147 0.148 0.141 0.307 0.123 0.330 0.439 0.108
H 0.467 0.533 0.213 0.108 0.101 0.115 0.463 0.221 0.458 0.291 0.030
PG 0.466 0.534 0.182 0.094 0.090 0.127 0.507 0.286 0.478 0.221 0.015
P2 0.460 0.540 0.159 0.085 0.080 0.141 0.534 0.377 0.450 0.166 0.007
P3 0.460 0.540 0.143 0.078 0.075 0.167 0.538 0.488 0.389 0.120 0.002
Pop. share 0.489 0.511 0.336 0.160 0.143 0.120 0.241 0.161 0.388 0.361 0.091
H 0.462 0.538 0.321 0.149 0.128 0.092 0.310 0.267 0.479 0.229 0.025
PG 0.452 0.548 0.301 0.137 0.121 0.091 0.350 0.306 0.476 0.198 0.021
P2 0.446 0.554 0.285 0.124 0.115 0.089 0.387 0.343 0.464 0.176 0.017
P3 0.443 0.557 0.270 0.114 0.111 0.087 0.417 0.375 0.452 0.160 0.013
Pop. share 0.487 0.513 0.276 0.160 0.145 0.134 0.285 0.140 0.365 0.398 0.097
H 0.457 0.543 0.276 0.140 0.120 0.092 0.372 0.254 0.479 0.241 0.026
PG 0.445 0.555 0.260 0.128 0.114 0.090 0.408 0.297 0.477 0.205 0.021
P2 0.437 0.563 0.245 0.116 0.109 0.089 0.442 0.340 0.464 0.179 0.017






Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The poverty indexes are compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure
as indicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in
equivalent unites using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty
line is set at 0.5 times average equivalent consumption expenditure. The decomposition
by educational level considers only individuals in the 25-54 age class. Panel 3a reports
the sub-group indexes by socio-economic dimension, panel 3b reports the contribution
share of each sub-group index to the overall index.Table 4a: Poverty indexes by socio-economic dimension and macro-region, 2005








H 0.067 0.078 0.068 0.054 0.059 0.044 0.101 0.126 0.079 0.034 0.018
PG 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.021 0.025 0.015 0.005 0.003
P2 0.0037 0.0045 0.0030 0.0025 0.0029 0.0025 0.0067 0.0084 0.0044 0.0012 0.0007
P3 0.0014 0.0018 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 0.0027 0.0036 0.0017 0.0004 0.0002
H 0.079 0.094 0.083 0.058 0.076 0.050 0.119 0.141 0.097 0.045 0.015
PG 0.015 0.019 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.009 0.025 0.029 0.017 0.009 0.003
P2 0.0048 0.0059 0.0044 0.0034 0.0043 0.0027 0.0084 0.0082 0.0048 0.0029 0.0009
P3 0.0019 0.0024 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0012 0.0035 0.0028 0.0018 0.0013 0.0003
H 0.290 0.316 0.299 0.288 0.280 0.232 0.364 0.440 0.336 0.197 0.113
PG 0.069 0.077 0.071 0.068 0.064 0.051 0.094 0.126 0.079 0.038 0.023
P2 0.0250 0.0279 0.0261 0.0245 0.0221 0.0170 0.0350 0.0509 0.0280 0.0113 0.0067
P3 0.0110 0.0123 0.0119 0.0107 0.0093 0.0071 0.0156 0.0241 0.0121 0.0042 0.0024
H 0.148 0.165 0.168 0.142 0.138 0.108 0.187 0.287 0.181 0.087 0.044
PG 0.033 0.038 0.037 0.031 0.030 0.023 0.045 0.077 0.040 0.016 0.009
P2 0.0115 0.0131 0.0129 0.0108 0.0098 0.0074 0.0159 0.0299 0.0135 0.0048 0.0025






Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The poverty indexes are compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure
as indicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in
equivalent unites using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty
line is set at 0.5 times average equivalent consumption expenditure. The decomposition
by educational level considers only individuals in the 25-54 age class. Panel 4a reports
the sub-group indexes by socio-economic dimension, panel 4b reports the contribution
share of each sub-group index to the overall index.Table 4b: Poverty indexes by socio-economic dimension and macro-region, 2005








Pop. share 0.487 0.513 0.223 0.134 0.163 0.144 0.335 0.050 0.359 0.463 0.128
H 0.448 0.552 0.211 0.101 0.133 0.087 0.469 0.120 0.540 0.296 0.044
PG 0.444 0.556 0.185 0.090 0.124 0.088 0.513 0.133 0.573 0.255 0.039
P2 0.438 0.562 0.164 0.083 0.118 0.087 0.547 0.157 0.593 0.217 0.033
P3 0.433 0.567 0.151 0.080 0.112 0.084 0.574 0.183 0.603 0.185 0.029
Pop. share 0.480 0.520 0.232 0.128 0.160 0.145 0.336 0.049 0.322 0.481 0.148
H 0.438 0.562 0.224 0.087 0.141 0.084 0.465 0.112 0.505 0.348 0.035
PG 0.432 0.568 0.210 0.082 0.136 0.074 0.500 0.125 0.466 0.369 0.040
P2 0.429 0.571 0.190 0.080 0.127 0.074 0.529 0.115 0.447 0.399 0.039
P3 0.423 0.577 0.168 0.085 0.114 0.081 0.551 0.100 0.413 0.450 0.037
Pop. share 0.486 0.514 0.295 0.141 0.153 0.133 0.278 0.095 0.403 0.401 0.101
H 0.464 0.536 0.291 0.134 0.141 0.101 0.333 0.156 0.506 0.295 0.042
PG 0.459 0.541 0.286 0.131 0.134 0.092 0.357 0.196 0.519 0.249 0.037
P2 0.458 0.542 0.290 0.130 0.128 0.085 0.367 0.227 0.529 0.213 0.032
P3 0.459 0.541 0.300 0.129 0.122 0.081 0.370 0.252 0.536 0.186 0.027
Pop. share 0.485 0.515 0.250 0.135 0.159 0.140 0.315 0.065 0.367 0.445 0.123
H 0.458 0.542 0.267 0.122 0.139 0.097 0.375 0.145 0.513 0.300 0.042
PG 0.454 0.546 0.261 0.119 0.133 0.090 0.397 0.181 0.523 0.259 0.038
P2 0.453 0.547 0.263 0.119 0.126 0.085 0.407 0.210 0.531 0.226 0.032






Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The poverty indexes are compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure
as indicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in
equivalent unites using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty
line is set at 0.5 times average equivalent consumption expenditure. The decomposition
by educational level considers only individuals in the 25-54 age class. Panel 4a reports
the sub-group indexes by socio-economic dimension, panel 4b reports the contribution
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Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The headcount ratio is compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure as in-
dicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in equiv-
alent units using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty line
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Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The headcount ratio is compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure as in-
dicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in equiv-
alent units using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty line
ranges between 0.2 and 0.6 times average equivalent consumption expenditure.A Proofs of propositions
In order to de￿ne the background for the formal proofs of the statements made
in the main text, we ￿rst provide a version of an important result that is due
to Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1934) and that forms the basis of the theory of
economic inequality. The result establishes an equivalence relation between the
inequality ordering that can be de￿ned on the basis of the set of additively sepa-
rable, monotonic decreasing and convex inequality functions and transformations
of a given income distribution by means of simple increments and rank preserving
progressive transfers.
Theorem A.1 (Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1934)): Given two income distri-
bution vectors x;x0 2 X for a population of a given size n 2 N the following
conditions are equivalent:
(a) x0 ￿ Bx where B is a bistochastic matrix of order n;
(b) for any monotone decreasing and convex real valued function ￿ : R+ ! R,












(d) the income distribution x0 2 X is obtained from the income distribution x 2 X
through a sequence of simple increments and rank preserving progressive transfers.
Proof: We provide the main elements of the proof in four steps showing that (a)
implies (b), (b) implies (c), (c) implies (d) and (d) implies (a):
(a) implies (b): take ￿rst the income distribution x00 = Bx where B is a bis-
tochastic matrix of order n and note that any bistochastic matrix of order n
can be written as a weighted sum of m permutation matrixes of order n such
that B =
Pm
i=1 ￿i￿i where 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ 1 for all i = 1;:::;m,
Pm
i=1 ￿i = 1 and






i=1 ￿(xi). Next, since by assumption x0 ￿ x00 and the












i=1 ￿(xi) as re-
quired;
(b) implies (c): for given v 2 R+ de￿ne the function ￿ as ￿(!) = v ￿ ! for ! < v
and ￿(!) = 0 for ! ￿ v and note that this is a monotonic decreasing and convex
function. Now take the number v 2 R+ such that v = xk, for integer number k =

















together these inequalities imply
Pk
i=1 xk ￿ x0
i ￿
Pk
i=1 xk ￿ xi and this leads to
36the required result (Berge (1963) pp. 184-188);
(c) implies (d): for this part of the proof we note that it is possible to ￿nd an





i=1 xi for all integer





i=1 xi and x0 ￿ x00. It is then possible to show
that the income distribution x00 can be obtained from the income distribution x
by sequence of rank preserving progressive transfers (Berge (1963) pp. 184-188).
It follows that x0 can be obtained from x by a sequence of simple increments and
rank preserving progressive transfers;
(d) implies (a): the steps that allow to show that condition (c) imply condition
(d) also allow to identify a bistochastic matrix B of order n such that x00 = Bx.
It follows that x0 ￿ Bx as required.
In the proof of theorem A.1 we should take note of the separate roles played by
the assumptions of monotonicity and convexity of the function ￿ : R+ ! R. The
assumption of convexity is used to transform the income distribution vector x 2 X
in the income distribution vector x00 2 X through rank preserving progressive
transfers. The assumption of monotonicity to transform the income distribution
vector x00 2 X in the income distribution vector x0 2 X through simple increments.
In the present context we use the theorem in order to provide a relation between
the poverty orderings that can be de￿ned on the basis of the set of monotonic
decreasing and Schur-convex poverty index functions and the notions of ￿rst order
and second order stochastic dominance. We begin by proving ￿rst the intermediate
results provided in section 2.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: (a) The assumption that the poverty index satis￿es the
property of monotonicity is equivalent to the assumption that the poverty index
function is monotonically decreasing by construction.
(b) In order to prove su¢ ciency note that if the poverty index function is Schur-
convex, then given an income distribution vector x 2 X with population size
n 2 N and number of poor q = q(x;z), for every bistochastic matrix B of order
n that takes the form B = BP ￿ In￿q, where BP is a bistochastic matrix of order
q, it follows that P(Bx;z) ￿ P(x;z). Moreover, given two distribution vectors
x;x0 2 X for a population of a given size n 2 N, if the distribution x0 is obtained
from x by a rank preserving progressive transfer between two individuals i and
j such that xi;xj 2 Z, there exist a bistochastic matrix B of order n such that
B = BP ￿ In￿q, where BP is a bistochastic matrix of order q, In￿q is an (n ￿ q)-
dimensional identity matrix and x0 = Bx. The matrix BP = [bij] for i = 1;:::q
and j = 1;:::q is de￿ned by a coe¢ cient 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and letting bii = bjj = ￿,
37bij = bji = 1 ￿ ￿ and bkl = ￿
l
k for k;l 6= i;j, where ￿
l
k is the Kronecker symbol
￿
l
k = 0 for k 6= l and ￿
l
k = 1 for k = l (Berge (1963) pp. 180-184). It follows that
P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z).
To prove necessity we need to show that weak transfer implies that for every
income distribution vector x 2 X of a given population size n 2 N and every
bistochastic matrix B of order n that takes the form B = BP ￿In￿q, where BP is
a bistochastic matrix of order q = q(x;z), it holds true that P(Bx;z) ￿ P(x;z).
For a given income distribution vector x 2 X of population size n 2 N take thus
any such bistochastic matrix B of order n and de￿ne x0 = Bx. Theorem A.1 then
implies that the distribution x0 can be obtained from x by a sequence of rank
preserving progressive transfers. In particular, given the block diagonal form of
the bistochastic matrix B and the income vector partitions x0 = (x0
P;x0
NP) and






n), xP = (x1;:::;xq),
xNP = (xq+1;:::;xn), it holds that x0
P = BPxP and x0
NP = xNP and therefore by
theorem A.1 the poor income vector x0
P is obtained from the poor income vector
xP by a sequence of rank preserving progressive transfers. This in turn implies
that the income vector x0 is obtained from the income vector x through a sequence
of rank preserving progressive transfers between individuals whose income belongs
to the poverty domain Z. Since by assumption the poverty index satis￿es weak
transfer and x0 = Bx, it follows that P(Bx;z) ￿ P(x;z). Note ￿nally that this
result does not depend on the choice of the income distribution vector x or of the
matrix BP.
The proof of corollary 2.1 follows along the same lines of the proof of Lemma 2.1
but we apply the latter one to the more restrictive case of an additively separable
function that takes the form of equation (2.1).
Proof of corollary 2.1: (a) If the individual poverty index function p is monotoni-
cally decreasing then by Lemma 2.1 the poverty index satis￿es monotonicity. Con-
versely, if the poverty index satis￿es monotonicity then p must be monotonically
decreasing.
(b) In order to prove this part of the corollary consider an income distribution
vector x 2 X for a population of size n 2 N and denote with x0 a permutation
of x such that x0
j = xi and x0
i = xj for i;j = 1;:::;n such that xi;xj 2 Z and
xi ￿ xj, and xk = x0
k for all k 6= i;j. A rank preserving progressive transfer
between individuals at income levels i and j can then be represented by a vector
x00 = ￿x+(1￿￿)x0 for some 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, where x00 represents the income distribution
obtained from the rank preserving progressive transfer. Now note that if the
38individual index function p is convex then P(x00;z) ￿ P(x;z), by de￿nition of
convexity. Conversely, if the poverty index satis￿es weak transfer then P(x00;z) ￿
P(x;z) for all values of ￿ such that 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Since the latter result does not
depend on the choice of the vector x 2 X this in turn implies that the individual
index function p is convex.
Lemma 2.1 is used in the proofs of the main theorems of the paper, that are stated
in section 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: We provide the proof in three steps, showing that (a)
implies (b), (b) implies (c) and (c) implies (a):
(a) implies (b): take z 2 Z and suppose that x0 ￿ x with x0
i ￿ xi for at least
one i = 1;:::;n such that xi belongs to the poverty domain or xi 2 Z. Now
note that by Lemma 2.1 all indexes in the class P1 satisfy monotonicity and hence
P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z) for all poverty index functions P 2 P1. Instead if the poverty
line z 2 Z is such that there does not exist i = 1;:::;n such that x0
i ￿ xi and
xi 2 Z then P(x0;z) = P(x;z) for all poverty index functions P 2 P1 since we are
assuming that the focus axiom is satis￿ed.
(b) implies (c): the class of additive separable monotonic functions P0
1 is a subset
of the class of monotonic poverty index functions P1 and therefore x0P1(Z)x im-
plies x0P0
1(Z)x; the result then follows using standard arguments in the theory of
stochastic dominance, see for example Fishburn (1980).
(c) implies (a): the headcount ratio, as a function of the poverty line, takes the
form H(x0;z) = k ￿ 1 for x0
k￿1 ￿ z < x0
k and k = 1;:::;n, where we assume
x0
0 = 0 given the income distribution x0 2 X and the form H(x;z) = k ￿ 1 for
xk￿1 ￿ z < xk and k = 1;:::;n, where we assume x0 = 0 given the income
distribution x 2 X. Now suppose that x0
k < xk for some k = 1;:::;q(x;z) and
some z 2 [0;z+], then it would follow that H(x0;z) > H(x;z) for x0
k ￿ z < xk,
contrary to the assumptions in part (c) of the proposition. Hence, x0
k ￿ xk for all
k = 1;:::;q(x;z) and all z 2 [0;z+].
Proof of Corollary 4.1: We prove this result noting that condition (a) implies con-
dition (b) by conventional arguments in the theory of stochastic dominance, since
P0
1 is the class of additive separable monotonic poverty index functions that take
the form de￿ned in equation (2.1). Conversely, given condition (b) by Theorem 4.1
the income distribution x0 2 X poverty dominates the income distribution x 2 X
for the class of poverty indexes P1 and the range of poverty lines Z ￿ [z￿;z+] and
39therefore x0P1(Z)x. Condition (a) then follows since the class of poverty indexes
P0
1 is a subclass of the class of poverty indexes P1.
Proof of Theorem 4.2: We provide the proof in three steps showing that (a) implies
(b), (b) implies (c) and (c) implies (a):
(a) implies (b): we consider in logical sequence ￿rst the e⁄ect of rank preserving
progressive transfers and then the e⁄ect of simple increments.
Suppose that there are K such rank preserving progressive transfers. For the
k ￿ th transfer for k = 1;:::;K and for a given poverty line z 2 Z there are
three cases: (i) the income distribution vector x(k￿1) 2 X is transformed into
an income distribution vector x(k) 2 X through a rank preserving progressive
transfer between individuals i and j such that xi;xj 2 Z; (ii) the rank preserving
progressive transfer occurs between individuals i and j such that xi 2 Z and
xj = 2 Z; (iii) the rank preserving progressive transfer occurs between individuals
i and j such that xi;xj = 2 Z. In case (i) theorem A.1 implies that there exist a
bistochastic matrix B(k) of order n, that takes the form B(k) = B
(k)
P ￿ In￿q where
B
(k)
P is a bistochastic matrix of order q = q(x;z) and In￿q is the identity matrix of
order n￿q such that x(k) = B(k)x(k￿1); in case (ii) we reclassify the rank preserving
progressive transfer as a simple increment and put B(k) = In and x(k) = x(k￿1);
in case (iii) by the focus axiom the rank preserving progressive transfer can be
ignored and therefore also in this case we can put for convenience B(k) = In and
x(k) = x(k￿1). We let x(k￿1) = x for k = 1. Proceeding recursively through the
sequence of K transfers, we get an income distribution vector x00 2 X that is
obtained from the income distribution vector x 2 X through the sub-sequence
of rank preserving transfers that occur between individuals i and j such that
xi;xj 2 Z. This in turn implies that there exist a bistochastic matrix B of order n
such that x00 = Bx. The bistochastic matrix B of order n can be computed as the
product of the bistochastic matrixes that are used in each step of the sequence,
such that B = B(1)B(2) ￿￿￿B(K).
Next, we note that simple increments transform the income distribution vector
x00 2 X into an income distribution vector x0 2 X such that x0 ￿ x00.
By assumption, there exist some poverty line z 2 Z such that some of the rank
preserving progressive transfers fall in case (i). For all poverty lines of this type and
for all poverty index functions belonging to the class P2 it follows that P(x00;z) ￿
P(x;z), because all poverty index functions in P2 are Schur-convex and therefore
by Lemma 2.1 all these functions satisfy the property of weak transfer. Instead, for
the poverty lines z 2 Z such that all of the rank preserving progressive transfers fall
40in cases (ii) and (iii), P(x00;z) = P(x;z) for all poverty index functions belonging
to the class P2, since for these cases we have put for convenience x00 = x.
Finally, since all poverty index functions belonging to the class P2 are monotonic
decreasing, and therefore by Lemma 2.1 they satisfy the property of monotonicity,
and given that the income distribution vector x00 2 X is transformed into an
income distribution vector x0 2 X through a sequence of simple increments such
that x0 ￿ x00; it holds that P(x0;z) ￿ P(x00;z) for all poverty lines z 2 Z.
The above arguments imply that P(x0;z) ￿ P(x;z) for all poverty lines z 2 Z.
(b) implies (c): the class of additive separable, monotonic and Schur-convex func-
tions P0
2 is a subset of the class P2 and therefore x0P2(Z)x implies x0P0
2(Z)x. By





i=1 xi for all k = 1;:::;q(x;z)
for all poverty lines z 2 Z. The result follows upon noting the poverty gap is
de￿ned as: PG(x;z) = 1=n(x)
Pq(x;z)
i=1 (z ￿ xi)=z.





i=1 xi for all k =
1;:::;q(x;z) for all poverty lines z 2 Z imply that the income distribution vector
x0 2 X is obtained from the income distribution vector x 2 X through a sequence
of simple increments and rank preserving progressive transfers that occur for indi-
viduals i such that xi 2 Z and between individuals i and j such that xi;xj 2 Z for
some z 2 Z. This in turn implies that there exist a suitable bistochastic matrix
B of order n, that takes the block diagonal form B = BP ￿ In￿q where BP is a
bistochastic matrix of order q = q(x;z) and In￿q is the identity matrix of order
n ￿ q, such that x0 ￿ Bx.
Proof of Corollary 4.2: We prove this result noting that condition (a) implies
condition (b) by theorem A.1, since P0
2 is the class of additive separable, monotonic
and Schur-convex poverty index functions that take the form de￿ned in equation
(2.1). Conversely, given condition (b) by Theorem 4.2 the income distribution x0 2
X poverty dominates the income distribution x 2 X for the class of monotonic and
Schur-convex poverty indexes P2 and the range of poverty lines Z and therefore
x0P2(Z)x. Condition (a) then follows since the class of poverty indexes P0
2 is a
subclass of the class of poverty indexes P2.
41B Statistical appendix
Table B.1: Headcount ratio by macro-region at di⁄erent levels of the relative
poverty line, 1997-2005
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
1997 0.001 0.005 0.012 0.021 0.038 0.057 0.084 0.120 0.162
1998 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.019 0.035 0.056 0.083 0.114 0.153
1999 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.033 0.051 0.078 0.110 0.145
2000 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.020 0.034 0.056 0.087 0.121 0.157
2001 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.030 0.050 0.076 0.111 0.146
2002 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.021 0.033 0.053 0.081 0.115 0.153
2003 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.019 0.034 0.054 0.082 0.117 0.156
2004 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.027 0.045 0.073 0.106 0.142
2005 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.015 0.029 0.048 0.073 0.106 0.145
1997 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.020 0.038 0.064 0.098 0.139 0.184
1998 0.002 0.007 0.014 0.028 0.047 0.074 0.111 0.148 0.203
1999 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.033 0.058 0.088 0.123 0.169 0.216
2000 0.003 0.009 0.021 0.035 0.066 0.099 0.147 0.202 0.246
2001 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.032 0.051 0.089 0.129 0.179 0.231
2002 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.024 0.049 0.074 0.106 0.148 0.192
2003 0.001 0.004 0.009 0.022 0.038 0.059 0.091 0.133 0.176
2004 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.022 0.043 0.071 0.105 0.148 0.198
2005 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.023 0.035 0.059 0.087 0.129 0.168
1997 0.009 0.027 0.055 0.099 0.160 0.227 0.293 0.361 0.430
1998 0.011 0.029 0.058 0.104 0.159 0.222 0.289 0.357 0.419
1999 0.010 0.030 0.062 0.108 0.165 0.225 0.289 0.351 0.425
2000 0.011 0.029 0.061 0.108 0.163 0.234 0.298 0.368 0.428
2001 0.009 0.025 0.055 0.100 0.157 0.225 0.297 0.367 0.431
2002 0.009 0.025 0.052 0.092 0.148 0.209 0.276 0.350 0.424
2003 0.009 0.023 0.047 0.089 0.143 0.199 0.268 0.344 0.411
2004 0.010 0.030 0.063 0.109 0.170 0.234 0.303 0.373 0.442
2005 0.010 0.029 0.061 0.102 0.159 0.229 0.306 0.379 0.455
1997 0.004 0.013 0.027 0.049 0.082 0.120 0.163 0.211 0.263
1998 0.005 0.014 0.029 0.052 0.082 0.120 0.163 0.208 0.259
1999 0.005 0.014 0.029 0.053 0.085 0.120 0.162 0.207 0.259
2000 0.005 0.014 0.030 0.054 0.086 0.128 0.174 0.225 0.271
2001 0.004 0.011 0.025 0.049 0.079 0.120 0.165 0.215 0.264
2002 0.004 0.012 0.025 0.047 0.078 0.113 0.156 0.206 0.258
2003 0.004 0.011 0.023 0.045 0.074 0.107 0.150 0.201 0.251
2004 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.050 0.081 0.118 0.161 0.209 0.260





Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The headcount ratio is compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure as in-
dicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in equiv-
alent units using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty line
ranges between 0.5 and 0.6 times average equivalent consumption expenditure.Table B.2: Headcount ratio by age class at di⁄erent levels of the relative poverty
line, 1997-2005
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
1997 0.003 0.010 0.021 0.044 0.079 0.118 0.162 0.213 0.267
1998 0.003 0.011 0.024 0.047 0.076 0.116 0.160 0.206 0.259
1999 0.004 0.011 0.026 0.050 0.081 0.118 0.159 0.200 0.258
2000 0.003 0.009 0.026 0.050 0.081 0.126 0.172 0.224 0.272
2001 0.004 0.010 0.022 0.047 0.076 0.119 0.167 0.217 0.267
2002 0.004 0.011 0.022 0.044 0.076 0.112 0.156 0.209 0.268
2003 0.004 0.010 0.019 0.039 0.068 0.103 0.149 0.204 0.257
2004 0.004 0.011 0.025 0.046 0.078 0.114 0.158 0.210 0.264
2005 0.005 0.014 0.028 0.048 0.075 0.119 0.168 0.221 0.276
1997 0.002 0.006 0.017 0.035 0.068 0.104 0.142 0.187 0.240
1998 0.004 0.011 0.023 0.043 0.073 0.108 0.148 0.190 0.237
1999 0.003 0.010 0.022 0.040 0.065 0.095 0.133 0.173 0.220
2000 0.004 0.010 0.023 0.043 0.071 0.106 0.152 0.204 0.248
2001 0.004 0.009 0.021 0.039 0.065 0.097 0.137 0.180 0.225
2002 0.004 0.010 0.019 0.036 0.060 0.093 0.134 0.181 0.232
2003 0.004 0.010 0.019 0.036 0.062 0.089 0.129 0.179 0.225
2004 0.004 0.011 0.023 0.043 0.071 0.106 0.144 0.188 0.238
2005 0.004 0.010 0.026 0.041 0.066 0.100 0.142 0.184 0.235
1997 0.002 0.010 0.019 0.037 0.063 0.096 0.135 0.179 0.225
1998 0.002 0.008 0.019 0.038 0.061 0.094 0.131 0.175 0.226
1999 0.003 0.011 0.024 0.043 0.070 0.101 0.137 0.178 0.226
2000 0.002 0.008 0.019 0.037 0.063 0.101 0.142 0.188 0.232
2001 0.002 0.006 0.016 0.037 0.059 0.100 0.140 0.184 0.230
2002 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.034 0.058 0.087 0.125 0.174 0.225
2003 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.031 0.053 0.083 0.121 0.170 0.218
2004 0.004 0.011 0.023 0.042 0.068 0.099 0.138 0.185 0.239
2005 0.002 0.009 0.020 0.037 0.063 0.099 0.138 0.189 0.241
1997 0.003 0.008 0.018 0.032 0.053 0.082 0.112 0.151 0.189
1998 0.003 0.008 0.015 0.029 0.050 0.077 0.109 0.143 0.181
1999 0.003 0.008 0.016 0.033 0.057 0.081 0.115 0.152 0.197
2000 0.002 0.008 0.019 0.037 0.058 0.090 0.123 0.167 0.203
2001 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.028 0.047 0.077 0.111 0.152 0.193
2002 0.002 0.006 0.014 0.031 0.053 0.079 0.111 0.144 0.188
2003 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.027 0.047 0.072 0.107 0.145 0.190
2004 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.032 0.052 0.078 0.114 0.150 0.194
2005 0.003 0.005 0.015 0.027 0.049 0.075 0.108 0.147 0.194
1997 0.008 0.024 0.046 0.075 0.117 0.160 0.212 0.267 0.326
1998 0.010 0.023 0.045 0.077 0.116 0.159 0.211 0.265 0.321
1999 0.008 0.021 0.044 0.074 0.116 0.160 0.211 0.266 0.320
2000 0.010 0.026 0.050 0.080 0.123 0.173 0.229 0.285 0.336
2001 0.006 0.018 0.039 0.072 0.115 0.163 0.214 0.277 0.330
2002 0.005 0.016 0.039 0.067 0.107 0.151 0.201 0.257 0.308
2003 0.006 0.018 0.037 0.068 0.105 0.146 0.194 0.249 0.299
2004 0.005 0.017 0.039 0.067 0.105 0.150 0.199 0.253 0.304






Note: Estimates are obtained from Istat￿ s HBS o¢ cial publications for the years 1997-
2005. The headcount ratio is compiled using equivalent consumption expenditure as in-
dicator of economic welfare. Household consumption expenditure is converted in equiv-
alent units using the LIS-OECD power scale with parameter ￿ = 0:5. The poverty line
ranges between 0.5 and 0.6 times average equivalent consumption expenditure.References
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